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a b s t r a c t
How does government drive the corporate social responsibility of firms that supply it with goods and
services? This paper reviews relevant theory and practice to describe ways in which public procure-
ment shapes corporate social responsibility, and it builds upon theory to develop testable propositions
to describe these influences. Using the case of U.S. defense procurement, statistical analysis indicates a
significant relationship between the extent to which firms engage in defense procurement and the
corporate social responsibility orientations of their managers. The findings have application both for
social responsibility theory and for public procurement policy and practice.
Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
Noting that research in corporate social responsibility1 (CSR)
tends to focus on CSR-related behaviors as independent variables
that affect profitability (see, for example, Aupperle et al. (1985),
Berman et al. (1999)), scholars have called for more study of these
behaviors as dependent variables (Campbell, 2007; Hiss, 2009).
In particular, they call for increased attention to institutional
factors (e.g., laws, rules, norms) that serve as drivers to influence
and shape a firm’s CSR (Williamson et al., 2006). While the effect
of laws and regulations on CSR is often noted (see, for example,
Goodpaster (1991), p. 2; Phillips et al. (2003), pp. 490–491), and
while some research examines the role of governments in
encouraging or enforcing CSR (Aaronson, 2005; McCrudden,
2006, 2007; Moon, 2004), few have studied how, specifically,
governmental actions might affect CSR activities or orientations.
1.1. Purpose, scope, and method
This paper responds to the call for study of institutional drivers
of CSR by examining how engaging in public procurement2 affects
a firm’s CSR. When a firm supplies goods and services to the
government, it has greater exposure to governmental influences
than other firms in at least two related ways: first, by virtue of the
buyer–seller relationship; and second, in the legal–regulatory
regime that the government as buyer constructs to administer
that relationship. These higher levels of exposure to governmental
influences create the potential for a firm’s CSR to be shaped
differently through public procurement than the CSR of firms
with less extensive relations with government. To put it another
way, if government is indeed a driver of CSR, its effects should
be more evident in those firms from which it buys than in
other firms.
Extending this argument, government’s influences on CSR
should be most evident in those domains of public procurement
which are most highly regulated and where buyer–seller relation-
ships are closest. Accordingly, this paper focuses on defense
procurement in the United States (U.S.) for three reasons. First,
the procurement of defense products and services is subject to
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1 Recognizing the contested nature of CSR definitions (Matten and Moon,
2008, pp. 405-406), this paper accepts Moon’s definition as ‘‘business responsive-
ness to social agendas in its behavior and to the performance of these responsi-
bilities’’ (Moon, 2004, p. 2).
2 Listed as a ‘‘key topic’’ for Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management
(Elsevier, 2012), public procurement includes a variety of means by which
(footnote continued)
government agencies and organizations acquire supplies and services from out-
side sources. It encompasses acquisition, contracting, buying, renting, leasing, and
purchasing, to include functions such as requirements determination and all
phases of contract administration (Thai, 2001, pp. 42–43). In the public sector,
‘‘procurement’’ and ‘‘contracting’’ are both commonly used: procurement in the
broad sense as the process of acquiring property or services, beginning with
determination of a requirement and ending with contract completion (Nash et al.,
2007); and contracting as narrower in scope, including description (but not
determination) of a requirement, solicitation and selection of sources, and
contract administration (Cohen and Eimicke, 2008; Garrett, 2011; Greve, 2008).
Thus, contracting is defined as a subset of procurement.
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intense scrutiny—and thus extensive regulation—in most devel-
oped nations (Rhodes, 2002). Second, the American institutional
system for defense procurement is recognized as one of the
world’s most mature and extensive (Kausal, 1999; Kausal and
Markowski, 2000). Third, defense products and services often
have high asset specificity, which tends to bind government
buyers and defense firm suppliers more tightly in the defense
market than in other markets (McGuinness, 1994; Williamson,
1986). From a methodological perspective, U.S. defense procure-
ment thus represents a case of public procurement in which
government’s influences on CSR should be strongest: if these
influences are not manifested here, they would likely not be
manifested in other cases.
In order to study public procurement’s effects on CSR, this
paper uses data obtained from well validated instruments and
methodologies that characterize the CSR orientations of firm
managers according to four domains: economic, legal, ethical,
and discretionary (Aupperle et al., 1985; Carroll, 1979, 1991).
Specifically, it examines the CSR orientations of managers in firms
that supply defense products in order to determine how these
orientations vary with the extent of business these firms do with
the U.S. government.
1.2. Contributions
This study builds upon existing CSR theory, and it tests that
extension in the realm of public procurement, thus contributing
to theory and practice in several ways. In addition to shedding
light on a neglected topic—how doing business with the govern-
ment may shape a firm’s CSR—it also is the first empirical work of
which the authors are aware that relates CSR to public procure-
ment. Since, as will be discussed, prior research has documented
CSR orientations of firms in general, this study of those firms that
engage in public procurement enables comparisons with those
other firms. It also provides unique insights into government’s
influences on CSR in the defense industry sector.
Further, the paper builds upon each of CSR’s two main conceptual
approaches: institutional theory and agency theory. It highlights
institutional factors in its focus on the highly regulated environment
of public procurement, but it also emphasizes stakeholder relation-
ships in the buyer–seller relationship of government and private
industry. In the public procurement context, neither institutional nor
agency theory alone has adequate explanatory power; rather, both
provide useful insights.
Finally, the analysis has application for public procurement
policy and practice. Specifically, the study should be useful for
policy makers who seek to drive CSR-related behaviors via public
procurement’s institutional arrangements (see, for example,
Kidalov (2011), Knight et al. (2003), Snider and Rendon (2008))
without unduly inhibiting entry of commercial firms into public
procurement. Similarly, public procurement managers (e.g., gov-
ernment purchasing managers), who are responsible for admin-
istering these institutional arrangements and who have close,
day-to-day dealings with the government’s suppliers, will gain
awareness of how their work may influence the CSR of these
firms, and hence as well, a heightened appreciation of the
importance of doing their jobs proactively, professionally, and
ethically (Monczka et al., 2011, p. 593; van Weele, 2010, p. 397).
1.3. Organization
The paper begins by reviewing representative selections from
the relevant literature of CSR as it relates to government action
generally and to public procurement particularly. It then
describes current public procurement policy and practice, empha-
sizing the U.S. defense procurement context, to document and
categorize the various ways in which they may influence CSR. It
draws on CSR theory to develop a framework that furthers
understanding of public procurement’s influences on CSR, and
which suggests relevant propositions. It develops and tests
appropriate hypotheses, discusses the results, and concludes with
remarks on implications for theory and practice.3
2. Literature review
The literature on CSR orientations deserves attention at the
outset because of its importance through the remainder of the
paper. Numerous studies from the 1980s to the present have
measured CSR for firms and groups of firms in terms of their
managers’ orientations to each of Carroll’s (1979, 1991) four
domains: economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary. These stu-
dies employ a standard survey to determine relative weightings
(on a ten-point scale) that reflect managers’ CSR orientations
towards the four domains. The survey consists of 20 forced-choice
weighted questions with six additional demographic questions.
Each forced-choice question provides a value statement and four
choices of answers to which the respondent can allocate a
combined value of 10 points; this construct enables measurement
of each component of CSR orientation. Each answer is assigned to
one of the four CSR domains as in the following example:
It is important to perform in a manner consistent with:
A. Expectations of corporate stockholders. (economic)
B. Expectations of government and the law. (legal)
C. Philanthropic and charitable expectations of
society.
(discretionary)
D. Expectations of societal mores and ethical
norms.
(ethical)
The wide and sustained use of this instrument by scholars to
examine various industry segments and populations provides
ample evidence of its merits.4
An example of one such study, which is cited for comparison
purposes below (see 5.1.2), characterized the CSR orientations of chief
executive officers of firms in the 1981 Forbes Annual Directory. These
managers placed the heaviest emphasis on the economic domain,
followed by the legal, ethical, and discretionary domains. Their scores
for the economic domain were negatively correlated with those in
each of the other three domains (Aupperle et al., 1985). A review of
over 20 such studies (all employing the same survey methodology)
found that, while CSR orientation is attributable to a variety of factors
(e.g., gender, race, firm type, and industry type), this order of domain
emphasis (i.e., economic strongest, followed by legal, then ethical,
with discretionary last) occurred most frequently (Halpern, 2008).
None of these studies, however, focused on government or public
procurement as factors that might drive CSR orientations.
2.1. General theories of CSR
Garriga and Mele´ (2004) have mapped the terrain of various
CSR theories, sorting these into four categories: (1) instrumental
3 It should be noted that, while much of the literature review and policy
discussion is from the buyer’s perspective (i.e., government and public procure-
ment as CSR drivers), this paper examines supplier CSR orientations in order to
assess the buyer’s influences on those orientations.
4 See, for example, Acar et al. (2001), Aupperle et al. (1985), Burton et al.
(2000), Edmondson and Carroll (1999), Ibrahim and Angelidis (1993, 1994, 1995),
Ibrahim and Parsa (2005), Ibrahim et al. (1997), Petrick et al. (1994), Pinkston and
Carroll (1994), Smith and Blackburn (1988), Smith et al. (2001, 2004). The
instrument has been well tested for content validity and reliability; see Ibrahim
et al. (2008, p. 168) on the strength of this methodology.
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theories, which emphasize the economic (e.g., wealth creating)
benefits of CSR for the firm; (2) political theories, which focus on
corporate power and its responsible use in society; (3) integrative
theories, which highlight the firm’s responsiveness to societal
demands; and (4) ethical theories based on corporate responsi-
bilities to society.
For the purposes of this paper (and at the risk of oversimplification
considering space constraints), the focus is on two broader theories:
agency theory and institutional theory. Under agency theory are
placed various instrumental theories concerning value creation and
maximization (e.g., Jensen, 2002; Porter and Kramer, 2002; Prahalad
and Hammond, 2002), as well as stakeholder management and
normative theories that focus on relationships among and duties of
key individuals and groups (e.g., Berman et al., 1999; Freeman, 1984,
1994; Ogden and Watson, 1999; Rowley, 1997). While the substan-
tive differences in instrumental (‘‘stockholder’’) and stakeholder
perspectives (see, for example, Agle et al., 2008) must be recognized,
commonality may be seen in the CSR context in that both perspec-
tives emphasize a firm’s obligations to those outside its boundaries.
Public procurementmay be viewed as entailing, as Goodpaster (1991)
put it in his argument for ‘‘strategic stakeholder synthesis,’’ both a
moral relationship between management and stakeholders and a
fiduciary relationship between management and stockholders.
The remaining theories in the categories of Garriga and Mele´
(2004) are placed under the broad heading of institutional theory.
Institutional theory highlights both the formal and the informal
structures of social entities (e.g., governments and firms), as well as
the rules, norms, and expectations that enable stable and predictable
patterns of social relationships (Huntington, 1969; March and Olsen,
1989). Of particular interest for the CSR context is institutional
theory’s concern with the social structures in which norms, assump-
tions, and expectations are grounded, as well as the social mechan-
isms by which consensus and conformance may be achieved
(Shadnam and Lawrence, 2011). From this constructivist perspective,
actors contest what are to be accepted as legitimate social issues, and
firms seek legitimacy by adapting to the expectations of the wider
institutional environment (Hiss, 2009). Institutional theory thus
facilitates analysis of the ways in which the social environment
may influence those within it—specifically for the purposes of this
paper, firms engaging in public procurement.
Matten and Moon (2008) use institutional theory to develop
distinctions between ‘‘explicit’’ and ‘‘implicit’’ CSR. Approxi-
mately, explicit CSR corresponds to those behaviors in Carroll’s
(1979) discretionary domain (i.e., behaviors that firms choose to
exhibit), while implicit CSR corresponds to the legal domain
(i.e., behaviors that firms are expected or obligated to exhibit).
While Matten and Moon (2008) used this distinction to portray
national differences between the institutions of liberal market
economies (less rule-bound, in which explicit CSR dominates) and
those of coordinated market economies (more rule-bound, in
which implicit CSR prevails), this paper appropriates their con-
struct in its analysis of public procurement as a driver of CSR.
While addressing agency theory and institutional theory
separately for analytical purposes, it should be recognized that
they intersect. For example, the way firms treat their stakeholders
depends upon the institutional context in which they operate
(Campbell, 2007). As will be discussed, both agency theory and
institutional theory help explain key features of and motivations
behind corporate actions and attitudes in dealing with govern-
ments via public procurement.
2.2. Government and CSR
Several writers (Aaronson, 2005; Fox et al., 2002; Moon, 2004)
have analyzed the role and influence of government as a driver of
CSR. Fox et al. (2002) described government’s four possible roles:
(1) mandating (establishing minimum standards for CSR actions
within a legal framework); (2) facilitating (enabling or incentiviz-
ing firms); (3) partnering (with firms in CSR-related actions); or
(4) endorsing (providing acknowledgment or appreciation). De la
Cuesta Gonza´lez and Martinez (2004, p. 276) noted differences
between ‘‘voluntary’’ CSR approaches (win–win situations bene-
fiting both the firm and society) and ‘‘obligatory’’ approaches
(those in which government regulation of firms was necessary to
achieve societal benefit) in European states. Aaronson (2005)
endorsed the obligatory approach by the U.S. federal government,
arguing that market forces alone are insufficient to achieve
acceptable CSR levels. Albareda et al. (2007) surveyed policies of
European Union (EU) members, noting a variety of models and
approaches designed to improve business CSR practices. None of
these studies, however, attempted to determine specific results or
effects of governmental actions on CSR.5
None of these studies—or this present study—takes the posi-
tion that governments are more responsible than private firms.
They all, however, implicitly recognize that governmental structures,
processes, and rules embody, at least to some extent, constituents’
norms, values, and preferences (Snider and Rendon, 2008). Govern-
ments thus serve as reflections of ‘‘social agendas’’ (from Moon’s
(2004) CSR definition), albeit with certain authorities and powers to
enforce those agendas.
2.3. CSR in supply management theory
The expansion of scholarly interest in CSR, particularly as it
relates to sustainability in supply management, is evident over
the past decade (see, for example, Carter, 2004; Carter and
Jennings, 2000; Leire and Mont, 2010; Maloni and Brown, 2006;
Pagell and Wu, 2009; Salam, 2009; Tate et al., 2010). The broad
range of topics includes analyses of the drivers of supplier
diversity programs (Worthington et al., 2008); development of
frameworks for analyzing CSR practices in global supply chains
(Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen, 2009); and development of a
sustainable purchasing portfolio model that reflects the ‘‘triple
bottom line’’ (people, profit, planet) as the measure of sustain-
ability performance (Pagell et al., 2010). While some of these
studies suggested public procurement as an important factor (see,
for example, Worthington et al., 2008), it remained largely
unexamined. The literature on supplier management and CSR is
also relevant to the extent that it examines explicit attempts by
firms to influence and manage the CSR of external entities (i.e.,
their suppliers, associated systems, and processes) (Foerstl et al.,
2010; Pedersen and Andersen, 2006; Reuter et al., 2010; Spence
and Bourlakis, 2009).
2.4. CSR in public procurement theory
Considering the large sums governments perennially spend on
public procurement, surprisingly little attention has been paid to
its role and influence on CSR. McCrudden’s work is the notable
exception, as he provides an excellent treatment of CSR as it may
be influenced by public procurement, especially public procure-
ment law (2006, pp. 4–25). He argues that procurement law
provides a varying role depending on the subject matter of CSR,
the level of government authority, and even the place of perfor-
mance of the public contract.
5 Interestingly, while De la Cuesta Gonza´lez and Martinez (2004) noted that
public procurement was used as a tool for promoting CSR in several EU states, and
while Aaronson (2005) advocated that the U.S. government use public procure-
ment similarly, neither pursued this idea to examine how, specifically, public
procurement might influence CSR.
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Further, the scarce extant research sometimes fails to acknowl-
edge important characteristics and nuances of public procurement as
it might relate to CSR. For example, McWilliams and Siegel (2001,
p. 122) hypothesized a positive correlation between the number of
government contracts a firm has and its CSR because of contract
provisions dealing with preferences for minority-owned firms. Their
analysis, however, stemmed from agency theory (i.e., government as
stakeholder) and thus did not address the institutional basis for such
preferences. From an institutional perspective and from a private
firm’s view, minority preferences in contracting may have more to do
with complying with rules than with providing some discretionary
social benefit.
The majority of CSR-related scholarship in public procurement
pertains to sustainability, to include comparisons with the private
sector (see, for example, Brammer and Walker (2007); Walker et al.
(2008); Walker and Brammer (2009); Walker and Philips (2009)).
Oldroyd et al. (2011) noted that implementation of sustainable
procurement practices in the public sector depends on factors such
as potential cost savings, while the enhancement of reputation is the
main consideration for private firms. Here again, little attention is
paid to public procurement as a driver of sustainability.
To summarize this review of the literature, scholars have estab-
lished the relevance and role of governments in promoting CSR, and
they have also developed the concept of public procurement as an
important tool to that end. No research, however, has been accom-
plished to determine specific ways in which how government actions,
including public procurement-related actions, might shape or affect
a firm’s CSR.
3. CSR in public procurement policy and practice
This section gives some brief examples of various ways in
which governments at different levels (e.g., supranational,
national) have attempted to promote or enforce CSR via public
procurement. This provides a foundation of extant practices that
informs the paper’s subsequent theoretical developments.
CSR in international public procurement typically involves
self-regulation, voluntary codes, and encouragement measures,
such as the United Nations Global Compact, which unites multi-
national businesses in voluntary commitments to ten principles
in the areas of human rights, environment, labor, and anti-
corruption (McCrudden, 2006, p. 7). Transparency International,
for example, called for voluntary codes called ‘‘Integrity Pacts’’
which bind public authorities and bidders to certain anti-bribery
standards upon penalty of future exclusion for violators
Transparency International (2009).
CSR-related provisions in European public procurement con-
sist of requirements enabled by EU-level law and required by
national and local law. For example, in the context of small and
medium sized enterprises (SME), both the Public Procurement
Directive and the Defense Procurement Directive authorize
national authorities to include SME subcontracting provisions
(Kidalov, 2011, pp. 502–504). The Public Procurement Directive
also includes advisability of social and economic considerations in
public procurement (Kidalov, 2011, pp. 497–499).
CSR at the level of U.S. federal (i.e., national) public procurement
includes both voluntary codes and requirements imposed by the law.
An example of a voluntary code is the Defense Industry Initiative on
Ethics (Halpern, 2008, pp. 40–41). Statutorily-imposed CSR require-
ments include the Small Business Act’s authorities to set aside or
reserve procurements in whole or in part for SME, especially for small
high-tech firms seeking research and development contracts (Kidalov,
2011, pp. 483–485). Other mandates include employment non-
discrimination, veterans’ employment, and environmental require-
ments (Federal Acquisition Regulation, 2011, Subpart 9.4).
The Obama administration recently considered a ‘‘High Road’’
policy to reform government contracting (Brodsky, 2010a, 2010b).
This initiative stemmed from recent reports that some companies
received government contracts despite the fact that they were not
complying with tax, labor, or employment laws (see, for example,
Rendon and Rendon, 2006, 2009). Along with ensuring that
companies that do not comply with federal laws are not awarded
government contracts, the High Road policy would have favored
companies that pay their employees ‘‘living wages’’ and health
and retirement benefits when bidding for contracts (Brodsky,
2010a). The policy would also have included provisions favoring
companies that meet certain levels of community support and
environmental protection in contract awards.
This brief review gives an overview of public procurement’s
relationship to CSR, illustrating the interplay of institutional and
agency perspectives in public procurement. In general, public
procurement rules may be seen as making explicit certain societal
beliefs about who should benefit from the public procurement
regime (e.g., disadvantaged groups), how such benefits should
accrue (e.g., procurement set-asides), and the demands govern-
ment may legitimately make on those who earn its business (e.g.,
employment nondiscrimination). At the same time, those rules
are seen as broadening the range of stakeholders to which a firm
must respond and the nature of its responses.
It is reasonable to assume that public procurement’s influences
on firms are stronger when its structures (e.g., laws, processes)
are employed intentionally for CSR-related purposes than when
firms engage in self-regulation or adopt voluntary standards.
Accordingly, the paper now narrows its focus to examine the
specific ways in which public procurement may influence a firm’s
or industry’s CSR, using the structure of U.S. federal procurement
for illustrative rules and processes.
4. How U.S. public procurement Influences CSR
This section extends the discussion of preceding sections to
develop three major ways in which public procurement influ-
ences CSR: (1) through standards that apply to any firm seeking to
sell to the government; (2) through the contracting process in
proposal evaluations; and (3) through contract specifications and
deliverables that accomplish CSR-related purposes.6
4.1. Mandating CSR through responsibility and eligibility standards
Firms that pursue federal contracting opportunities must meet
specific mandatory requirements, many of which are related to
CSR principles. These requirements concern (1) standards of
responsibility, and (2) eligibility; they are the mandatory ‘‘rules
of the game’’ for a firm to follow if it wishes to pursue any
government contract. Once major industry players choose to
pursue the public market, it may be easier or cheaper for them
to be consistent in their CSR behaviors. CSR requirements are thus
the means by which public procurement potentially influences
the CSR of all firms that sell to the government.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (2011, Part 9) establishes
standards of responsibility that reflect wider principles of sustain-
ability and social responsibility. Its provisions require contrac-
ting officers to make affirmative determinations of suppliers’
6 A fourth means of influence, not addressed in this paper, concerns mimetic
or competition effects in which the CSR of firms engaging in public procurement
may influence the CSR of other firms, including those in its supply chain. Thus,
public procurement may have sector- or industry-wide effects that reach beyond
only those firms actually engaged in public procurement. Other more sophisti-
cated longitudinal studies are needed to examine this issue.
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responsibility by considering their financial resources, performance
record (including ethics and integrity), and production and technical
capacity, along with many other factors. Prospective suppliers bear
the burden of proof that they are responsible. They must also meet
certain eligibility requirements to sell to the government through
compliance and certifications in areas such as equal opportunity,
child labor, toxic chemical release reporting, affirmative action,
veterans’ employment, and compliance with international arms
control restrictions.
In addition to responsibility and eligibility standards, prospec-
tive contractors must include a subcontracting plan in their
proposals for negotiated contracts that exceed a certain dollar
threshold (currently, $650,000). The subcontracting plan must
include percentage goals and dollar amounts for the various
categories of SME (for example, disabled veteran-owned firms,
women-owned firms) to be used as subcontractors. (Federal
Acquisition Regulation, 2011, Part 19).
4.2. Promoting CSR through the contracting process
CSR may also be influenced by public procurement in certain
aspects of the contracting process. This influence differs from the
‘‘blanket’’ influence discussed in the previous section in that it is
exercised only in certain contracts or types of contracts.
First, public procurement may use CSR principles in the
contract award decision in evaluating contractor proposals. While
mandatory proposal evaluation factors include cost/price, quality,
past performance, and SME participation, the government’s pro-
curing agency has flexibility in determining the relative impor-
tance of the evaluation factors. For example, agency officials may
choose to rank SME participation as more important than other
factors in some contract awards, thus potentially influencing
bidders’ CSR.
The inclusion of mandatory evaluation factors is a variant of
this theme. Since the mid-1990s, past performance is a manda-
tory evaluation factor for procurements over $1M. To the extent
CSR considerations (such as SME subcontracting) are reflected in a
firm’s past performance, public procurement encourages firms to
have better performance records. It is possible that the future will
see the addition of more mandatory CSR-related factors, such as
green factors.
Finally, the procuring agency may include additional evalua-
tion factors unique to the specific procurement. These additional
factors may be assigned higher importance and used in a tradeoff
process in the contract award decision. For example, in an aircraft
development contract, green factors such as fuel efficiency or the
use of alternate fuel sources could be an important evaluation
factor. The procuring agency might choose to trade price for green
factors in evaluating proposals and award the contract to a
higher-priced bidder, if that firm proposes a ‘‘greener’’ aircraft.
4.3. Procuring CSR through specifications and deliverables
The specifications and deliverables (whether product or service) of
a particular procurement action may have CSR implications. That is,
public procurement may influence a firm’s CSR as a function of the
procurement action’s deliverable and its characteristics. For example,
winning and executing a contract for development of a particular
‘‘green’’ technology may influence a firm’s CSR orientation regarding
the environment. Other examples include contracts awarded for
relief efforts, such as those following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
(Government Accountability Office, 2010). In addition to accomplish-
ing public purposes, these contracts may serve to heighten the social
and humanitarian orientations of the winning firms.
5. Public procurement’s influences on CSR: the case of defense
procurement
The preceding discussion indicates that the possible types of
public procurement influences on CSR range from binding legal
requirements to discretionary procurement agency actions to
unique contract specifications and deliverables. Institutional the-
ory calls attention to these influences in terms of the laws,
regulations, and norms that permeate U.S. federal public procure-
ment. Agency theory, on the other hand, highlights relational
influences in, for example, mutual stakeholder relationships
between buyer and seller. It may be taken as axiomatic that the
extent of a firm’s exposure to these influences is dependent upon
the extent of its involvement in public procurement; that is, the
more public contracts a firm has, the more its exposure to public
procurement influences (including types of influences).
This raises the question of the extent to which these public
procurement influences affect a firm’s CSR. Here the discussion
returns to the explicit–implicit CSR construct (Matten and Moon,
2008) to extend their arguments to the realm of public procure-
ment. In this institutional construct, the implicit CSR of firms
involved in public procurement is tied to their roles in fulfilling
larger societal purposes through the provision of some product or
service for the public good and their adherence to the norms and
rules of the public market. This suggests the general proposition
that firms that sell mostly to governments exhibit implicit CSR (they
are more rule-bound), while those that sell mostly to other firms
exhibit explicit CSR (they are less rule-bound).
5.1. CSR of U.S. defense firms
The case of U.S. defense procurement provides a venue to
examine this proposition further. Specifically, this analysis builds
upon prior research (Halpern, 2008) on firms that sell products to
the U.S. Department of Defense (hereafter, ‘‘defense firms’’) and
which characterized the CSR of these firms in terms of their
managers’ orientations in each of the four CSR domains (i.e.,
economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary). It uses the data from
this research in order to extend the analysis beyond the descrip-
tion of defense firms’ CSR in order to address the question of how
the CSR of these defense firms was influenced by defense
procurement. A significant motivation for and benefit of using
this data is that it employed the same survey instrument and
replicated the same analysis of numerous other CSR orientation
studies of various groups and populations (see Section 2), with
accordingly high confidence in reliability and validity.
5.1.1. Data
The 20-question survey (described earlier, plus six additional
demographic questions) was sent to the study population con-
sisting of managers of all 1082 firms that provided electronics
equipment under contracts7 with the U.S. Army’s Communica-
tions and Electronics Command Acquisition Center, Fort Mon-
mouth, NJ, during the fiscal years8 of 2005–2007. The number of
firms responding to the survey was 192, and after eliminating
erroneously completed or incomplete responses, 169 firms’ (15.6
percent) responses were included in the demographic analysis
and 166 (15.3 percent) in the statistical analysis.
The response data were analyzed using SPSS 14.0. The demo-
graphic data revealed that very small businesses (fewer than 100
7 The electronics equipment included command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance products. The values of
the contracts ranged from several thousand dollars to approximately $1 billion.
8 Fiscal years for the U.S. federal government run from October 1 through
September 30.
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employees) comprised the largest group (39.1 percent) of respon-
dents, while very large firms (more than 10,000 employees)
represented the next largest group (28.4 percent). Most of the
firms (61.5 percent) reported deriving more than 75 percent of
their annual revenue from defense contracts. Almost half (43.8
percent) of the firms were based solely in the U.S., while almost a
third (30.8 percent) reported having locations in more than 10
countries.
5.1.2. CSR comparisons of defense firms and Forbes firms
Halpern (2008) calculated means and standard deviations for
participant scores in each of the four CSR domains. Principal
factor analysis and four-factor principal factor analysis with
varimax rotation were performed. Factor loadings were analyzed
to determine if all four CSR domains were represented, and
intercorrelations among the domains were analyzed.9 The results
were analyzed to compare the CSR orientation means with those
obtained from previous studies. The results revealed a significant
difference between the CSR orientations of managers of defense
firms and those of other managers (e.g., the 1981 Forbes Directory
managers [see Section 2], though of course some Forbes firms
engage in public procurement). The largest contributor to this
difference was the defense firm managers’ higher orientation
towards the legal domain; the legal domain was also the stron-
gest of the four domains for these managers (Table 1). Further,
while their orientation to the discretionary domain was the
weakest of the four, it was still weaker than that of Forbes
managers. Finally, unlike the significant negative correlations
found in the Forbes managers’ CSR orientation, defense managers’
CSR orientation in the economic domain showed a significantly
positive correlation with the legal domain and no significant
correlations with the remaining two domains.
Halpern (2008) concluded that defense firm managers’ atten-
tion to the highly regulated environment of defense acquisition
was the most likely contributor to these differences. This envir-
onment heightened managers’ sensitivities to rule compliance as
a matter of course in doing business with the government.10
Interestingly, he noted that the same environment also contrib-
uted to a stifling of discretionary activities, because of rules
regarding allowable costs for reimbursements. For example, while
a private firm may pass on costs of its philanthropy to customers
via higher prices, firms selling to the government may not include
those costs in the contract price.
In light of these findings, the legal domain of CSR is associated
with implicit CSR and the discretionary domain with explicit CSR,
and the earlier proposition is restated accordingly: The relative
strengths of a firm’s discretionary and legal domains are dependent
upon the extent of its involvement in public procurement (Fig. 1).
5.2. Explaining defense procurement influences on CSR orientation
Halpern’s (2008) analysis is extended in this paper by using his
data, which included in the demographic data the percentage of
annual revenue each respondent firm derived from contracts with
the Department of Defense. Here this percentage is taken as a
metric for the extent of a firm’s involvement in public procure-
ment. Of the 163 respondents, 59 were ‘‘low involvement’’ firms
that reported less than half their revenue from defense contracts,
while the remaining 104 were ‘‘high involvement’’ firms with
over 76% of revenue from defense contracts.
Table 2 provides statistics for the two samples. Note that the
order of domain emphasis for the high involvement firms is the
same as that noted for defense firms (i.e., the legal domain is
stronger than the economic domain); however, for low involve-
ment firms, the order of emphasis is the same as for the Forbes
firms (the economic domain is stronger).
5.3. Hypotheses and statistical tests
The preceding discussion suggests two hypotheses:
H1. Firms that have high involvement in public procurement have
higher legal CSR orientation than firms with low involvement.
H2. Firms that have high involvement in public procurement have
lower discretionary CSR orientation than firms with low involvement.
TABLE 1
Mean CSR orientations of managers (10 point scale).
Domain 1981 Forbes firms





























Fig.1. Public procurement influences on CSR.
Table 2
Comparison of CSR orientations.
Domain N Min Max M SD
Firms reporting 76–100% of revenue from defense contracts
Economic 104 0.00 5.65 3.06 1.02
Legal 104 2.05 5.40 3.33 0.58
Ethical 104 0.35 6.50 2.46 0.82
Discretionary 104 0.00 3.35 1.07 0.62
Firms reporting 1–50% of revenue from defense contracts
Domain N Min Max M SD
Economic 59 0.00 5.95 3.21 1.09
Legal 59 0.80 5.15 2.93 0.78
Ethical 59 0.80 3.80 2.34 0.69
Discretionary 59 0.15 5.75 1.20 0.82
9 The presence of the four CSR components was indicated through factor
analysis, and internal consistency coefficients ranged from.81 to.95 (Halpern,
2008).
10 This of course does not mean that defense managers engage in illegal
behavior to a lesser degree than other managers, rather only that they have more
rules to obey. Halpern (2008) found no significant difference in the ethical
orientations of defense managers and the Forbes managers.
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The analysis was conducted in two stages. First, the authors
considered a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) proce-
dure to be the most appropriate analytic technique for exploring
differences between the two groups: firms that have high invol-
vement in public procurement and firms with low involvement in
public procurement. This MANOVA compensates for variable
intercorrelation and provides an omnibus test of any multivariate
effect. Using an approximate F-statistic based on the Wilks’
lambda criterion, the MANOVA resulted in an F-value of 100.56,
significant at po0.001. From this test, it was concluded that there
were significant differences between the two groups. That is, the
CSR orientations of managers for firms that have high involve-
ment in public procurement are significantly different from that
of firms that have low involvement in public procurement.
Next, to understand the underlying contributions of the vari-
ables to the significant multivariate effect, means were computed
and univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) conducted for the
two groups. As shown in Table 3, these results show that
differences between the two groups were significant for only
one of the dependent variables. Specifically, the mean scores on
the legal (F1,162¼9.24, p¼0.0027) component were 3.33 for firms
that have high involvement in public procurement and 2.93 for
firms that have low involvement in public procurement. No
significant differences between the two groups were observed
with respect to the discretionary (F1,162¼1.33, p¼0.2509), eco-
nomic (F1,162¼1.01, p¼0.3172), and ethical (F1,162¼0.89,
p¼0.3492) component scores. Accordingly, the null hypothesis
for H1, which concerns the legal domain, is rejected (H1 is
accepted), but the null hypothesis for H2, which concerns the
discretionary domain, is not rejected (H2 is not accepted).
5.4. Discussion
These findings provide evidence that the configuration of a
defense firm’s CSR in the four domains depends substantially on
the extent to which it sells to the government. In particular, the
myriad rules of defense procurement appear to divert a firm’s
attention away from an economic orientation on profitability and
towards a legal orientation on compliance.
This explanation illuminates an interesting intersection of
institutional theory and agency theory. Essentially, a defense firm
wishing to sell to the government becomes profitable by winning
contracts, which means complying with the rules. Further,
because the institutional environment of laws and regulations
constrains the percentage of profit (or fee) that a firm may earn
on a contract,11 firms must win more or larger contracts in order
to become more profitable. Defense procurement results in a
firm’s wealth-creating and profit-maximizing motives and inter-
ests becoming inextricably linked to its adherence to accepted
norms and its alignment with governmental expectations. Clearly,
neither institutional nor agency theory alone explains this cir-
cumstance; rather, both are needed for a richer perspective.
This conclusion explains the difference in CSR orientation
correlations between the Forbes managers and defense managers
mentioned earlier. The three non-economic domains for the
Forbes managers were negatively correlated with the economic
domain, indicating these managers’ overriding focus on profit-
ability. That the economic and legal domains were significantly
and positively correlated for defense firm managers indicates the
strong connections these managers see between compliance and
profitability.
Regarding the discretionary domain, while high involvement
in defense procurement appears to decrease managers’ emphasis
on philanthropy, the relationship was found not to be significant.
If a relationship exists between defense procurement and the
discretionary domain, it does not appear as strong as that
between defense procurement and the legal domain. Thus,
defense procurement appears to influence a firm’s legal and
discretionary domains to different degrees.
6. Government as a CSR driver through public procurement
Extending these results to public procurement, the most
obvious implication of this analysis is the following: engaging in
public procurement leads a firm towards the government’s view
of ‘‘good’’ (i.e., exhibiting implicit CSR by obeying the myriad rules
and developing strong legal CSR orientation) while discouraging it
from pursuing voluntary philanthropy that reflects its own view
of good. This conclusion has significant implications for CSR practice,
policy, and theory.
6.1. Implications for theory
6.1.1. Implications for extant theory
First, the results provide mixed support for the hypothesis of
McWilliams and Siegel (2001, p. 122) that government contracts
and the provision of CSR are positively correlated. Interestingly,
the examples they gave to develop this hypothesis correspond to
CSR actions in the discretionary domain (i.e., proactive environ-
mental practices; community service) and the legal domain
(contract requirements for minority set-asides). Thus, the preced-
ing analysis tends to support their hypothesis for CSR actions in
the latter category, but not the former. From a theoretical
standpoint, this illustrates the importance of nuanced analysis
that admits a range of corporate behaviors and attitudes that
might be considered as socially responsible.
Regarding institutional theory, these findings oppose or at
least qualify the arguments of those (Matten and Moon, 2008;
Hiss, 2009) who discern tendencies toward explicit CSR in the
liberal economies of Europe and the U.S. Further empirical studies
that compare the CSR orientation of firms in the public procure-
ment and private sectors will help determine which tendencies
are indeed operative.
6.1.2. Implications for future theory
How do agency and institutional theories explain public
procurement’s effects on a firm’s CSR, and how might one build
upon these theories from this analysis? First, the discussion
calls attention to the choices that some firms have regarding
the extent to which they wish to engage in public procurement.
Except for those firms that produce goods and services that
may be used only by governments, other firms choose whether
Table 3
ANOVA results for differences of firms with high and low involvement in public
procurement.
Group means
High involvement Low involvement
Dependent variable (n¼104) (n¼59) F p
Economic 3.06 3.21 1.01 0.3172
Legal 3.33 2.93 9.24 0.0027
Ethical 2.46 2.34 0.89 0.3492
Discretionary 1.07 1.20 1.33 0.2509
11 For example, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (Subpart 215.4) provides
for application of weighted guidelines when determining reasonable profit for a
fixed-price contract. For cost-reimbursable contracts, it places ceilings on fee
amounts (e.g., 10% or 15% for fixed fee contracts; Part 15.4).
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or not to enter the public procurement regime. The reasons for
and consequences of this choice are fertile grounds for further
CSR research.
A firm’s decision to engage in public procurement is supposedly
made in the interest of profitability. In order to win contracts,
however, the firm must comply with public procurement rules and
procedures; compliance is instrumental for profitability. Thus, via
rule compliance, the firm serves both its stockholders and the
stakeholders whose interests the rules represent. But, unlike classic
stakeholder theory, the firm’s focus is on the rules, not the stake-
holders. In the public procurement context, the government serves as
proxy for other stakeholders whose interests are represented by the
rules. While this aspect of compliance is not unique to the public
procurement context, the analysis suggests that its influence is
strongest in firms that engage in public procurement.
The analysis calls attention to institutional differences in the
rules, norms, and attitudes in the public procurement and non-
public procurement regimes. Since public procurement uses
public funds, higher levels of accountability and higher stan-
dards of stewardship apply. Firms recognize that the ‘‘rules of
the game’’ are different in the public procurement context, and
the nature of their struggle for legitimacy (Hiss, 2009) is
accordingly different. Through increased rule codification and
specificity, the public procurement regime entails lower levels
of ambiguity and contingency, thus reducing the extent to
which a firm must engage in social interpretation and negotia-
tion to achieve legitimacy. The strong scores in the legal
domain of CSR orientation among managers of public procure-
ment firms reflects this perspective, but again, the details of
this institutional calculus represents uncharted territory in CSR
research.
In general, these findings indicate inadequacies in monistic
approaches to understanding CSR. In much the same way that,
according to Matten and Moon (2008), globalization results in
increasingly blurred lines between the generally explicit CSR of
U.S. firms and the generally implicit CSR of European firms,
engaging in public procurement results in a more complex
perspective of a firm’s CSR. As a firm operates in a unique
institutional environment with unique configurations of stake-
holders, both institutional and agency theories have explana-
tory power. Additional theoretical work is necessary here in
order to meld these two perspectives more adequately for the
public procurement context.
The authors recognize that this analysis is inadequate to
address the relative power of institutional and agency perspec-
tives in explaining public procurement’s influence on CSR. This
sort of enhancement to CSR knowledge might be accomplished by
operationalizing and measuring factors associated with each
perspective within public procurement agencies or processes,
and then using those as predictors of CSR orientations in the four
domains. An improved understanding of whether CSR might be
driven to a greater extent from an institutional (e.g., regulatory)
perspective or from an agency (e.g., relational) perspective may
be informative for both theory and practice.
Finally, this analysis indicates the utility of systems and
contingency perspectives that focus on the complexity of a firm’s
external environment as it engages in both public and private
markets. From these perspectives, an instrumental theory of CSR
might be proposed that highlights its function as a boundary-
spanning activity to help adapt a firm’s activities to its particular
environment.
6.2. Implications for practice and policy
For managers of firms that already do business with govern-
ments via public procurement, as well as for those who may be
considering entering the public procurement market, these
results should raise awareness of the variety of influences that
shape their firms’ CSR, perhaps in unforeseen or unintended ways.
To the extent a firm’s CSR agenda favors philanthropy, managerial
interventions may be required to keep the firm on the desired
course as it engages in public procurement.
For public authorities who make and execute public procure-
ment policy, these results should raise awareness of the potential
stifling effects of such policy on corporate altruism and philan-
thropy. Officials should consider the relevant socio-political
environment to assess the relative benefits of having suppliers
who are merely obeying rules and the benefits of having those
who are also philanthropic. Along these lines, public procurement
officials may wish to investigate the extent to which it is possible
to modify the Federal Acquisition Regulation so as to reward (or
at least not dampen) corporate philanthropy, perhaps by includ-
ing it as a potential source selection factor in contract awards or
establishing the allowability of philanthropic expenses.
Apart from effects on corporate philanthropy, these results
should remind public officials at all levels of government that the
institutional environment of public procurement poses barriers to
entry for some firms into the government marketplace. Any
changes to that environment, especially those that raise entry
barriers, should be viewed in light of the government’s continued
ability to have its requirements met by private-sector suppliers.
7. Conclusion
The authors recognize the limitations of the conclusions in
terms of external validity. Halpern’s sample consisted only of
managers in defense firms—arguably a niche public procurement
sector—and so the findings might not extend to other public
procurement sectors. This paper extended Halpern’s analysis of
defense firms through comparison of high and low defense
involvement firms. Further study is needed to examine the CSR
orientation of firms that deal mainly with state and local govern-
ments, as well as with non-defense federal agencies and other
national governments. Case studies and manager interviews
would aid in triangulation and in gaining insights into the extent
to which each of the public procurement influences discussed
earlier contributes to these orientations.
It is concluded that the relationships shown in Fig. 1 have
merit in explaining how public procurement shapes a firm’s CSR.
Clearly, more study is needed to explicate and verify these
relationships more completely. Studies like this one can inform
policy-makers with insights into the influences of their decisions
on firms that sell to the government, as well as the possible
tradeoffs between implicit and explicit CSR in promoting the
public good.
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